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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In David Hitchcock’s paper, we may distinguish two theses. On the one hand, there is 
a proposal regarding the meaning of the word ‘so’ and related terms which are used to 
express an inferential relationship between two claims. On the other hand, there is a 
conception of the warrant of an argument as a general rule that justifies its inference-
claim. Both theses are interrelated in Hitchcock’s account, because he aims to 
establish that the meaning of ‘so’ is equivalent to “the claim that some generalization 
of the argument’s associated negajunction is non-trivially true” (p. 4), and Hitchcock 
considers that 
  
any such generalization is equivalent in force to a rule that claims an entitlement: ‘Data such 
as D entitle one to make claims such as C,’ i.e. what Toulmin (1958, p. 98) calls a warrant. 
(Hitchcock, p. 4) 
 
Hitchcock says that warrants are specific rules that “act as support” for 
inference-claims (p. 4). That is, he conceives of Toulminian warrants as justifications 
for inference-claims. 
The defence of these theses in “‘So’” involves both a negative and a positive 
part. The negative part consists in criticising my thesis (Bermejo-Luque, 2006) that 
the inference-claim of an argument is the corresponding material conditional. The 
positive part consists in defending the above-outlined conception of inference-claims 
against a series of criticisms that I have raised here and there. Consequently, my tasks 
in this commentary should be the opposite: to defend the material conditional account 
of inference-claims and to outline the problems of a conception of warrants as 
justifications for inference-claims. But, because of space constraints, I will have to 
limit myself to the first of these tasks. 
 
2. THE MEANING OF ‘SO’ 
 
Hitchcock says that  
 
∗ My debt to David Hitchcock is unpayable: not only he has been so generous as to take into account 
the views of an almost beginner, but he has also helped me to develop my own ideas in several ways, 
always encouraging my efforts, even when they were against his own views. If this is not enough, he is 
the best editor that a non-native speaker can ever have! 
Regarding the present work, I wish to thank also Prof. Bob Ennis: the three of us have had a 
great discussion about my “odd views” that makes me think that our field, Argumentation, is unique in 
its bringing about the easiest and most fruitful meetings, regardless of the academic status of the 
discussants. 
The work presented here has been financially supported by the Juan de la Cierva Program of 
the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science.  
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roughly speaking, a conclusion indicator like ‘so’ indicates that the sentence that it 
immediately precedes follows from the sentence that immediately precedes it, perhaps in 
combination with other sentences in the immediate context. (Hitchcock, p. 1) 
 
I take it to be a good idea to consider that the inferential use of an inferential 
particle is tantamount to an implicit inference-claim, so that terms like ‘so’, 
‘therefore’, ‘consequently’, and the like, when used to express inferential 
relationships, convey this claim. But let me underline, at this early stage, that I 
conceive of inference-claims as claims, that is to say, as speech acts of a certain sort. 
With Hitchcock, I take these claims to be implicit in the inferential uses of ‘so’, and to 
mean that from the reason(s) alleged the conclusion follows. 
Now, it is commonly acknowledged that ‘mean’ is a rather ambiguous word. 
In particular, most philosophers of language distinguish between the pragmatic and 
the semantic conditions that determine the use of any expression. Let us then consider 
how the inference-claim of an argument manages to mean that the conclusion follows 
from the reason(s). 
Hitchcock also says that 
 
[the] conditional ‘If the premisses are true, then the conclusion is true’ … clearly is the 
argument’s inference-claim (Hitchcock, p 2. His italics) 
 
This is another point of agreement between Hitchcock and me: we both 
conceive of the inference-claim of an argument as an indicative conditional. But his 
thesis is that, in order to capture the ‘following’ sense involved in it, we should 
understand this conditional as the claim that some covering generalization of the 
argument’s associated material conditional is true. Thus, part of his goal in his paper 
is to criticise my thesis that the inference-claim of an act of arguing is just this 
material conditional–that is, a conditional whose antecedent is the premiss or the 
conjunction of the premisses and whose consequent is the conclusion. 
In his paper, Hitchcock argues against my account of the inference-claim by 
exploiting the well-known paradoxes of material implication. Certainly, if we 
consider his examples, there seems to be something odd about an interpretation of 
inference-claims as material conditionals: no ‘following’ sense seems to be at stake in 
arguments like ‘Snow is white, so grass is green’, or ‘20,472 is divisible by 3, so 
20,472 is divisible by 9’. Certainly, the common usage of indicative conditionals 
seems to suggest that truth-functionality cannot be their interpretation: under this 
interpretation, a proposition like ‘if you don’t like it, you can go’ would be true just in 
case ‘you like it’ or ‘you can go’, or both, were true. This consequence is indeed 
paradoxical: it seems wrong to say ‘if you don’t like it you can go’ in just the same 
circumstances as we would say ‘either you like it or you can go’. So we should 
dismiss any interpretation of indicative conditionals that brings it about that they are 
equivalent to the material conditional. 
Yet, as is well known, in “Indicative Conditionals” Grice (1989) challenged 
this view. According to Grice, the truth-conditions of common indicative conditionals 
are properly captured by the material conditional. As he argues, this is something we 
can see in claims like ‘if you are the president, I’m the queen of France’, where the 
‘following’ sense of the conditional is lost in favour of bringing about a pragmatic 
implicature like ‘it’s highly implausible that you are the president, just as implausible 
as it is that I’m the queen of France’. On Grice’s account, the paradoxes of the truth-
functional interpretation of conditionals arise as a matter of violations of the Maxim 
of Quantity when putting forward an indicative conditional: the reason why, in 
 2
COMMENTARY ON  DAVID HITCHCOCK 
general circumstances, we should not put forward a material conditional when we 
mean that its antecedent is false is that merely putting forward the negation of the 
antecedent expresses the same proposition in a simpler manner. And similarly if we 
mean that its consequent is true.1 If we just mean that the premiss is false or that the 
conclusion is true, to put forward an indicative conditional amounts to a violation of 
the Maxim of Quantity. That is the reason, according to Grice’s account, for the 
oddity of claims like ‘if tomorrow is Sunday, snow is white’. But there are cases in 
which it may be pragmatically sound to state an indicative conditional in order to 
mean either that the antecedent is false (‘if you are the president, I’m the queen of 
France’) or that the consequent is true (‘you’re not gonna drive it in this state, if my 
name is Jane’). 
Respecting argumentation, the assertibility conditions of the material 
conditional whose semantic content is the inference-claim’s semantic content would 
convey the ‘following’ sense that we perceive in the implicit inference-claims of our 
arguments: in offering a reason for a conclusion, we assert the reason and we 
presuppose that we do not already know the truth-value of the conclusion. These 
pragmatic constraints are presupposed by the activity of giving and asking for reasons. 
Without them, either no argumentation would be really going on or its assesment 
would be senseless. That means that in determining the truth-value of the inference-
claim of an argument, i.e. what I take to be the material conditional, we can assume 
neither that a reason is false nor that the conclusion is true. As a matter of fact, 
determining its truth-value under these constraints would involve considering the 
positive relevance of the reason(s) for the claim—that is, whether there is a causal, 
legal, moral, or formal, etc. consequence relationship between reason and 
conclusion.2 Herein lies the ‘following’ sense of this claim. If we cannot find any 
positive relevance of the reason(s), or if there are actual rebuttals for such a positive 
relevance, we will have to take it that the implicit inference-claim is false. For sure, if 
there is no consequence relationship between reason(s) and conclusion, we can still 
know that the material conditional is true by coming to know either that the 
antecedent is false or that the consequent is true, or both. But in that case, we will 
have to say that, despite the fact that its inference-claim is true, it is a bad argument 
from a pragmatic point of view, its problem being that the reason is worthless as a 
means to show that the conclusion is true. In this case, the argument will be invalid, 
but not because its inference-claim is false, but rather because it is wrong: just as 
wrong as saying that there is a station a hundred metres in that direction when the car 
is out of fuel and we know that the station is closed, even though what we say may be 
perfectly true. 
Consequently, the alleged counter-example to my position, ‘20,472 is divisible 
by 3, so 20,472 is divisible by 9’, is not a good one: even though the premiss of this 
argument, when offered, is supposed to be true and we may have not yet determined 
                                                 
1 There is a long literature on the interpretation of indicative conditionals. However, my thesis does not 
require a general answer to the question of whether indicative conditionals in English always stand for 
material conditionals plus some pragmatic constraints. Rather, for our purposes it is enough to make 
plausible that the most adequate interpretation of inference-claims is the one that Grice proposes for 
indicative conditionals in English. 
2 The validity of traditional formally valid arguments is easy to determine: the conditional whose 
antecedent is the conjunction of the premisses and whose consequent is the conclusion will turn out to 
be a formal truth (within the system according to which we say that the argument is formally valid). 
Also, the validity of conceptually valid arguments like ‘He is a bachelor, so he is unmarried’ will be 
straightforward: their inference-claim is a conceptual truth, so that we will not have to consider the 
truth-value of the reason or the conclusion in order to determine that the conditional is true. 
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whether the conclusion is true, the thing is that in order to determine that the 
corresponding material conditional is true we have to determine that the conclusion is 
true. So, on my account, the argument will be invalid, despite having a true inference-
claim. 
The fact that the inference-claim is true makes it necessary that, if the reason is 
true, the conclusion is true. So, on this account, the validity of an argument rules out 
the possibility that the reason is true and the conclusion false. But the truth of the 
inference-claim is not enough to say that the argument is a good one: certainly, there 
is something odd about the argument ‘Snow is white, so grass is green’. But, on my 
view, this oddity is due to the pragmatic constraints of argumentation. 
Yet Hitchcock considers that: 
 
The word ‘so’ implies, as part of its meaning and not as some pragmatic implicature of its 
ordinary use, that the statement preceding it is relevant to the statement following, in the sense 
that it helps to establish the truth of the conclusion (Hitchcock 1992). (Hitchcock, p. 4) 
 
Thus, on his view, the indicative conditional that endorses the inference-claim 
of an argument is to be interpreted as the claim ‘the conclusion follows from the 
reason(s)’, so that an argument whose conclusion does not follow has a false 
inference-claim. And in support of his view, he adduces that if we assume that the 
inference-claim is the material conditional, the only invalid arguments will be those 
whose premisses are actually true and whose conclusions are actually false (p. 4). Yet, 
according to the above definition, this is not quite so: an argument will be invalid if 
we cannot show that the corresponding material conditional is true without assuming 
either that the conclusion is true or that the reason is false, or both. 
At this point, we find the source of our disagreement: I do not think that the 
above definition of ‘follows’ constitutes the semantic content of the inference-claim. 
Rather, I think that the content of the inference-claim is the corresponding indicative 
conditional, whose semantic conditions are those of the material conditional, and 
whose pragmatic conditions convey the ‘following’ sense that is involved in this type 
of conditional. 
My reasons for rejecting Hitchcock’s conception of warrants and inference-
claims will have to await another occasion. 
 
link to response                                                                                            link to paper
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